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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WILLIA~f

B. I\1ASON,
Plaintiff an.d Respondent,
Case No.

-vs.-

8198

WAYNE N. MASON,
Defendant and Appellant.

Respondent's Brief
STATE1\'IENT OF FACTS
This action arose out of a sale by the Government
of thirteen 40 acre tracts of land in Boxelder County.
Both William B. ?\Iason, Respondent, and Wayne N.
Mason, Appellant, claimed a preferential right to purchase the land. After various proceedings before the
Bureau of Land Management, it finally determined that
six of the 40 acre tracts should be awarded to the appellant and seven to the respondent. After patents issued,
the respondent brought this action to have the court
determine that the Bureau of Land Management had
1
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misapplied the law, and that the appellant held the six
tracts a'varded to him in trust for respondent. The trial
court awarded three additional 40 acre tracts to respondent, and Wayne Mason appealed. Appellant contends
that the trial court should not have disturbed the decision
of the Bureau of Land Management. The Respondent
takes the position that under the applicable federal
~tatutes, none of the 13 tracts should have been awarded
to the appellant, and urges this court, by way of crossappeal, to award all 13 tracts to him.
The Statement of Facts by the appellant is not complete, and we deem it necessary to make a more detailed
presentation. The court should note at the outset that
the lands in question 'vere offered for sale under a.uthori ty of Section 2455 of the Revised Statutes, as amended,
( 43 U.S.C. 1946 Edition, Supplement 4, Section 1171),
which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to sell at
public auction isolated or disconnected tracts of the
public domain. The statute then expressly provides:
''For a period of not less than 30 days after
the highest bid has been reeeiYed, any owner or
o"Tners of contiguous land shall have a preference right to buy the offered land at such highest
bid price, and "~here t\vo or more persons apply
to c_}xercise such preference right, the Secretary
of the Interior iR authorized to make an equitable
division of the lands among such applicants.''
rrhe application for the publie sale of the lands here
involved was made by respondent. (J1Jx. P-10). Pursuant
'to that application, the lands were offered for sale SepSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tember 28, 1949, (Ex. P-10) ..At that sale the appellant
made the high bid of $2.05 per acre, (Ex. P-10). On
October 11, 1949, respondent claimed his preferential
right to purchase all of the land and submitted payment
therefor. (Ex. P-10). Since the preferential right to
purchase is based on the O\vnership of land contiguous
to the public lands we reproduce here a map (Ex. P-6)
which sho\vs the land ownership.
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The thirteen 40 acre tracts are sho,vn in the center
in 'vhite. The respondent is the owner of the Wm. B.
:Yiason Ranch (colored blue). It 'vill be noted that the
William B. ~{ason Ranch abuts this land along the entire
\vest side, with the exception of one 40 acre tract, which
is colored in dark red. It is this one 40 acre tract upon
which the appellant based his claim for a preferential
right to purchase (Ex. P-10). It 'vill also be noted that
along the entire north and east sides the public tracts in
question are surrounded by the national forest and lands
owned by the State of Utah. The only other contiguous
private land was owned by Jesse Lamb, and it abuts the
public tract on the south. Lamb 'vas not an interested
' ·,
bidder.
At the time of the public sale ther.e was in effect a
Regulation, 43 Code Federal Regu~tion~,. 295.11, which
in part provided :
'' (b) * * * Such preferential right is not extended to ~he owner or owners of cornering lands.
"(1) A preference right to pur~hase must be

supported by proof of the claimant's ownership
of the whole title to the contiguous land (that is
he must sho"r that he had the 'vhole title in fee)
and must be accompanied by the purchase price
of the land.''
At the time the application for public sale 'vas made
by respondent he o\vned all of the land shaded in blue
in Exhibit P-6 (R. 57). The national forest lands are
rather effectively separated from the tracts being offered
for sale by rough terrain, and in the normal operation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of the lands cattle "rould not move from these tracts to
and from the forest, (R. 81). Glen Mason, whose lands
are shown in ·Exhibit P -6, only had lands which ''cornered'' with the public lands. Under the above regulation he 'vould not have been a preferential bidder, and
as indicated, neither Glen l\1ason nor Lamb asserted any
interest. At the time of the application for public sale
by respondent the appellant owned no land 'vhatever in
this area. On September 24th, four days prior to the
date of the sale, appellant received a quitclaim deed,
from one Nish, to a 40 acre tract 'vhich abutted one of
the thirteen tracts being offered for sale, as is shown by
Exhibit P-6, (R. 67). At the time Mr. Nish gave appellant
the quitclaim deed he did not hold fee title to the land,
but was merely acquiring the same under a contract of
purchase from Union Life Insurance Company, (R. 67,
68, 69). The deed did not issue from the Union Life Insurance Company to Nish until October 4, 1949, 6 days
after the sale, (Ex. 4). On September 24th, Nish still
owed $450.00 on the land. Wayne Mason, appellant,
loaned l\Ir. Nish the payment (R. 67-69), and Union Life
Insurance Company executed a deed conveying title to
this 40 acre tract to Mr. Nish on October 4, 1949, (Ex.
P-4). Mr. Nish continued to hold the deed from Union
Life Insurance Company until March of 1950, at 'vhich
time he executed a new deed to Wayne lVIason, (Ex.
D-13).
The 40 acre tract acquired in the manner set forth
above by the appellant from Mr. Nish was of rather low
economic value. Marcellus Palmer, who qualified as a
5
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land use expert, testified that this particular laud was
gravelly and required considerable moisture in order to
gro\v forage, (R. 83-84). Neither the 40 acre tract acquired by appellants, nor the lands being offered for
sale, had any "'ater supply, either for irrigation or for
stock watering purposes, ( R. 80, 81). The land can be
used for grazing for a period of approximately three
months of the year and will support one C0\\ for each
fifteen acres. ( R. 84-85). Thus, on the 40 acre tract
acquired by appellant, he could have run only three head
of cattle for a period limited to three months of each
year and he had no \Vater supply on the land for any
such cattle, (R. 88-89); nor \vas there any water on any
of the land being offered for sale, ( R. 80-81-88-89). There
was water on the lands O\vned by William B. Mason and
on lands owned by Lamb. William Mason and Lamb
operated their cattle in common and they could utilize
the public lands for grazing (R. 91). There was \Vater
on the national forest, but it was not available to these
lands because of rough terrain. ( R. 81).
7

The parties hereto are brothers and the ranch now
owned by the respondent was acquired by their father
and is known as the William B. Mason Ranch, (R. 127).
The appellant had operated this ranch for a very substantial period of time, and during that time had filed
homestead applications on part of these 13 40-acre tracts,
(R. 127). He admitted that \Vhen he used the William
B. Mason ranch, these tracts were used with it, and the
ranch and these tracts were oper~ ted as a unit, ( R. 128).
The homestead applications \vere not perfected (R. 113Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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114). vVilliam B. Mason made his primary living from
the ranch (R. 98). It was upon this scene that the appellant interjected himself by getting a quit claim deed
to a 40 acre tract four days before the public sale from
a man "vho did not have fee title. It should also be noted
that the lands have such a low economic use (three cows
per 45 acres per season) as to make it uneconomic to
fence the lands (R. 86). It should also be noted that by
awarding the particular six tracts on the south end to
Wayne ~1ason, it effectively prevented vVilliam 1\!ason
from getting from his ranch to the 640 acre school section, (R. 91-92) "vhich he now leases (R. 61).
When both of the parties hereto asserted preferential rights, the Regional Administrator of the ColoradoUtah Region, Bureau of Land Management, determined
that appellant should be permitted to purchase the one
40 acre tract directly abutting the 40 acres quit claimed
to him. Upon this basis the manager of the Salt Lake
Office on April 13, 1950 issued a formal decision apportioning the public tracts between appellant and respondent on the basis of 12 tracts to respondent and one to
appellant, (Ex. P-10). An appeal was taken to the director of. the Bureau of Land Management on September
12, 1950, and the director affirmed the twelve to one
apportionment. Wayne 11ason then took an appeal to
the head of the department. The department head reversed the prior decisions, attempted to apportion the
land equally bet,veen the parties and thus six of the 40
acre tracts were given to the appellant and seven to the
respondent, (Ex. P-10). The opinion written by Mastin

7
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G. White, Solicitor for the Department, ruled that the
statute above set forth requiring an ''equitable division''
of the land required that it be destributed "equally".
At the time of the sale, a department regulation (43
C.F.R. 250.11-b-3) interpreted the statute, providing that
"the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to make an
equitable division of the lands among such applicants,"
to mean that the ''administrator will make a determination equally apportioning the various subdivisions among
the claimants''. Thereafter this interpretive regulation
was amended so that at the time of the trial the interpretive regulation read as follo,vs:
'' (b) Preference right of purchase; declaration of purchaser. * * *
'' ( 3) Where there is a conflict bet,veen t'vo or
more persons claiming a preference right of pur. chase, they 'vill be allowed 30 days from receipt
of notice within which to agree among themselves
upon a division of the tracts by subdivisions. In
the absence of an agreement an equitable division
of the land will be made taking into consideration
such factors as (i) the equalizing of the number
of acres 'vhich each claimant 'vill be permitted to
purchase, ( ii) desirable land use, based on topography, land pattern, location of 'vater, and similar
factors, and (iii) legitimate historical use, including construction and maintenance of authorized
improvements. If equitable consideTations dictate
all of the subdirisions may be awarded to one of
the claimants. Where only one subdivision is offered for sale and it adjoins the lands of two or
more preference right claimants, it 'vill, in the
absence of equitable considerations requiring
otherwise, be a'varded to the applicant for the
sale if he is a qualified person who properly
8
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asserts such a preference right within or prior to
the 30-day preference-right period. The manager
will make the a'vard by declaring the appropriate
claimant or claimants purchasers of the land.
(R.S. 2478, 43 U.C.S. 1201)
DOUGLAS McKAY
Sec.retary of the Interior

'' J nne 4, 1953. ''
The factual considerations 'vhich induced the trial
court to make the award of three tracts to appellant and
ten to respondent are set forth in Finding No. 8.
The trial court concluded that it was not equitable
"\vithin the meaning of the governing federal statute to
a pportiou the lands equally under the facts of this case,
but that it was equitable to apportion the lands ten to
the respondent and three to the appellant. The Court
went on to state:

"* *

that such an allotment gives both individuals
a way into lands owned by the State of Utah in Section
36 and to the National Forest (Ex. P -6) ; that plaintiff
is the owner of the "\Vater customarily used, and the only
"\Vater readily available for use with the public lands
offered for sale (R. 80, 81) ; that the defendant o'vns no
water on any tract near the lands offered for sale (R.
80, 81), and there is no 'vater on the lands being offered
for sale; that historically the lands now being offered
ior sale have been used in connection with the lands now
owned by the plaintiff (R. 127); that the plaintiff o'vns
considerable land, as is described above, in the immediate
vicinity of the lands offered for sale (Ex. P-6); that
:¥.,

9
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the defendant owned only a 40 acre tract 'vhich was quit
claimed to him only four days prior to the sale (R. 67)
and some forest permits, which are separated by a rough
terrain from the lands offered for sale (R. 81); that the
plaintiff operates his cattle in common with others in
the area; that the only water available for grazing these
lands, other than the water owned by plaintiff, is located
on the lands of the others with whom plaintiff operates
(R. 81); that the lands have value primarily for grazing
purposes ( R. 84, 85) ; that such historical use as the defendant had in connection with these lands was at a time
when he was the owner of the lands now owned and
operated by the plaintiff (R. 127); that the lands, because of their limited forage, are not of sufficient value
to make it economic to fence them and that these factors
and the location of the particular lands of the plaintiff
in relationship to the lands offered for sale make it
equitable to award 10 of the 13 40-acre tracts to the
plaintiff; that the forest permits and the one 40 acre
tract owned by the defendant make it equitable to a'vard
three of the 40 acre tracts to the defendant; that the
lands owned by the State of Utah in Section 36 were at
the time of the sale leased to the defendant, but at the
time of the trial were leased by the plaintiff; that these
lands could be utilized through such an award of these
public lands by either of the parties, if either of them
should continue to lease or in the future should purchase
said state lands."
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STATE~1ENT

OF POINTS

POINT I. rrHE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE.
POINT II. WAYNE MASON WAS NOT ENTITLED
TU ANY PREFERENTIAL RIGHT TO PURCHASE ANY OF THE LANDS IN QUESTION.
POINT III. ''EQUITABLE DIVISION'' AS REQUIRED IN SECTION 2455 OF THE REVISED
STATUTES, AS AMENDED (43 U.S.C. 1946 Ed.
Supp. 4, Sec. 1171) DOES NOT MEAN "EQUAL
DIVISION.''
The questions 'vill be discussed in the order suggested in the foregoing Statement of Points.
ARGUMENT
POINT I .. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE.

Johnson vs. Towsley, 80 U. S. 72, 13 Wall 72, 30 L.
Ed. 485, is a square United States Supreme Court case
involving the very same department as is involved here,
to wit, the Land Department. There the Land Department had issued a patent to the defendant. The plaintiff
claimed that the patent should have been issued to him,
exactly as the plaintiff is doing here. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari from a State Supreme
Conrt decision and squarely held that the state court
11
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had the power to correct the misapplication of the law
by the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau
of Land l\Ianagement. The opinion of the Court stated,
in part, as follows :
'' That the action of the Land Office in issuing
a patent for any of the public land, subject to sale
by pre-emption or otherwise, is conclusive of the
legal title, must be admitted under the principle
above stated, and in all courts, and in all forms
of judicial proceedings \vhere the title must control, either by reason of the limited powers of
the court, or the essential character of the proceeding, no inquiry ran be permitted into the circumstances under 'vhich it "~as obtained. On the
other hand, there has always existed in the courts
of equity the power in certain classes of cases to
inquire into and correct mistakes, injustice and
wrong, in both judicial and executive action, however solemn the form "l'hich the result of that
action may assume, when it invades private rights;
and by virtue of this power the final judgments
of courts of law have annulled or modified, and
patents and other important instruments issuing
from the Crown, or other executive branch of the
Government, have been corrected or declared void,
or other relief granted. No reason is perceived
V\rhy the action of the Land Office should constitute
an exception to this principle. * * *
''And so, if for any other reason recognized
by courts of equity, as a ground of interference
in such cases, the legal title has passed from the
United States to one party, 'vhen, in equity and
good conscience, and by the laws which Congress
has made on the subject, it ought to go to another,
'A court of equity \vill,' in the language of this
court in the case of Starks v. Starrs, just cited,

12
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'convert him into a trustee of the true owner, and
compel him to convey the legal title. * * *
" ... it is fully conceded that when those (land}
officers decide controverted questions of fact, in
the absence of fraud or imposition or mistake,
their decision on those questions is final, except
as they may be reversed on appeal in that department. But we are not prepared to concede
that when in the application of the facts as found
by them, they, by misconstruction of the law, take
from a party that to which he has acquired a legal
right under the sanction of those laws, the courts
are "rithout power to give any relief. * * *
''This court has at all times been careful to
guard itself against an invasion of the functions
confided by law to other departments of the government, and in reference to the proceeding before
the officers intrusted 'vith the charge of selling
the public lands it has frequently and firmly refused to interfere with them in the discharge of
their duties, either by mandamus or injunction,
so long as the title remained in the United States
and the matter was rightfully before those officers
for decision. On the other hand, it has constantly
asserted the right of the proper courts to inquire,
after title has passed from the Government, and
the question became one of private right, whether,
according to the established rules of equity and
the acts of Congress concerning the public lands,
the party holding that title should hold absolutely
as his own, or as trustee for another.''
This principle has also been clearly recognized by
the Utah Supreme Court. In the case of Warren Trr. Co.
v. Charlton, et a.Z., 58 Utah 113, the Utah court quoted
(page 123) 'vith approval from the case of Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530, 24 L. Ed. 848, where the court held
13
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that 'vhen mistake or fraud or misconstruction of the
law of the case exists, the United States, or any contesting claimant for the land, may have relief in a court
of equity; and S·rnelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 26
L. Ed. 875, which held that if in the issuing of a patent
the officers of that department take mistaken views of
the law, or draw erroneous conclusions from the evidence, or act from either imperfect views of duty or
corrupt motives, the party aggrieved cannot set up such
matters in a court of law to defeat the patent. He must
resort to a court of equity, where he can obtain relief,
if his rights are injuriously affected by the existence of
the patent, and he possesses such equities as will control
the legal title vested in the patentee. See also Steele v.
Allison, 33 Southwest 2nd, 842.

POINT II. WAYNE MASON WAS NOT ENTITLED
TO ANY PREFERENTIAL RIGHT TO PURCHASE ANY OF THE LANDS IN QUESTION.
The lands in question, consisting of thirteen 40 acre
tracts, were offered for sale as isolated tracts under the
provisions of Section 2455 of the Revised Statutes, as
amended. ( 43 U.S. 0.1\. Sec. 1171.) The pertinent portion
of that statute is quoted above and is requoted here for
convenience.
Section 2455 in part provides :

"*

* * it shall be lawful for t~ Secretary of
the Interior to order into market and to sell at
public auction * * * any isolated or disconnected
tract or parcel of the public domain not exceeding
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

one thousand five hundred and twenty acres which,
in his judgment, it would be proper to expose for
sale * '*' *; Provided, that for a period not less
than thirty days after the highest bid has been
received, any owner or owners of continguous land
shall have a preference right to buy the offered
lands at such highest bid price, and where two or
more persons apply to exercise such preference
right the Secretary of the Interior is authorized
to make an equitable division of the land among
such applicants. * * * ''
This is the language of the section in effect at the
time of the sale in question.
In 43 Code of Federal Regulations, 250.11, it 1s
provided:
''(b) Preference right of purchase; declaratio,n of purchaser. The owners of contiguous lands
have a preference right, for a period of 30 days
after the highest bid has been received, to purchase the land offered for sale at the highest bid
price or at three times the appraised price if three
times such appraised price is less than the highest
bid price. Such preference right may also be
asserted at any time prior to the commencement
of such period. Such preference right is not extended to the owner or owners of cornering lands.
'' ( 1) A preference right to purchase must be
supported by proof of the claimant's ownership
of the 'vhole title to the contiguous lands (that is,
he must show that he had the whole title in fee),
and must be accompanied by the purchase price
of the land. ''

There have been numerous cases in which a person
with less than the fee title has asserted a preference,

15
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and the preference has been disallowed. It seems to be
the settled interpretation of the statutes that a person,
in order to assert the preference, must have the fee title,
and that merely holding a contract of purchase or the
equitable title is not sufficient.
In the following appeals to the head of the Department of Interior it has been held that anything less than
the whole fee title is not sufficient upon which to base
a preference: In the case of Louise Olson, Raymond V.
Wagner, A-24143, February 16, 1943, unreported, one
who asserts a preference right to purchase an isolated
tract must own the complete fee title. In this case, the
claim of preference was rejected on the ground that the
applicant was merely a ''joint o"\vner'' of the contiguous
land. However, it was later granted on a showing that
he was acting on behalf of a partnership. In the case of
James L. McCreath, Vera Row, A-23942, October 13,
1944, unreported, although an applicant is permitted to
assert his preference right claim prior to the date of sale,
such as by the assertion of adjoining land ownership in
the public sale application, he must, of course, continue
to be a. contiguous owner in fee at the time of the sale.
It is clear under Utah la"T that Wayne Mason was
not the owner of any contiguous land either at the date
of the sale or at any period within 30 days thereafter.
The evidence is uncontradicted that Wayne 1\fason has
no other land except the 40 acres which were quit claimed
by 1\fr. Nish. On September 24th, the only thing Nish
owned 'vas a contract under which he was purchasing
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the land in question. At that time he gave Wayne ~Iason
a quit claim deed. The quit claim deed could not pass to
\Vayne Mason anything more than Nish owned. When
Nish subsequently acquired the legal title between October 4th and October 8th, this title would not pass from
Nish to Wayne Mason, because a quit claim deed will
not pass an after acquired title. Wayne ~Iason, of course,
recognized this and sometime during March of the following year got a new deed from Nish.
It seems to us, therefore, that the evidence requires
a holding that Wayne Mason received a quit claim deed
from a man who did not have the fee title; and that he
did not get the fee title from Mr. Nish until March of
1950, nearly six months after the sale. Since he was not
the owner of ·contiguous land on September 28, 1949, or
within 30 days thereafter, Wayne Mason was not entitled, under the statute, to a preference. If he had no
preference, all of the land, as a matter of law, should
have been sold to William Mason, who admittedly did
have a preference.
The cases to the effect that a quit claim deed will
not pass an after acquired title are extremely numerous.
See, for example, 26 C.J.S. Deeds, Section 118 on page
416, where it is stated that a quit claim deed will convey
'vhatever title
''Or interest the grantor may have in the land
at the time it is given and only such title or interest and excludes any implication that he has
any title or interest. * * * Of course, a quit claim
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deed given at a time when the grantor has no title
or interest ·does not convey anything, although it
may operate as a contract to convey the title or
interest subsequently acquired. * * * ''
''An after acquired title by the grantor will
not, as a general rule, inure to the benefit of the
grantee under a quit claim deed. So a quit claim
deed not purporting to convey any particular interest will not convey a possible future interest
of the grantor.''
In Nix v. Tooele County, 101 Utah 84, 118 P. (2d)
376, the Utah Supreme Court said:
"Plaintiff's title is founded upon quit claim
deeds. Such deeds do not imply the conveyance
of any particular interest in property. (Citing
statutes) Plaintiffs acquired only the interest of
their grantors, be that interest what it may."
Also to this effect see 26 C.J .S. Deeds Section 105,
page 385, which states that a deed which does not manifest a contention to convey after acquired title will not
be construed to so do.
''Where the language is clear and unambiguous and there is no intention apparent from the
instrument to convey after acquired property or
title, the deed will not be construed as a conveyance thereof. In order to convey an after acquired
interest, it is necessary either specifically to mention the intention of the grantor so to do or to
make such recitals as will preclude him from
thereafter disputing the full force and effect of
his conveyance. * * * ''
The abstracts of title (Ex. 1, 2, 3) clearly show that
William l\1ason \Yas the owner of several contiguous
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tracts at the time of the sale and during the entire 30
day period thereafter. He testified that he asserted his
preferential rights and paid the money. (R. 62). The
decisions of the Department also recite that he asserted
his preference and paid the money (Ex. P-10). Since he
'vas the only ''owner of continguous land'' within the
meaning of the Federal statute, he is the only person
entitled to a preference, and is the only person who
should have been permitted to purchase any of the
lands in question.
POINT III. ''EQUITABLE DIVISION'' IN SECTION
2455 OF THE REVISED STATUTES, AS
A}IENDED ( 43 U .S.C. 1946 Ed. Supp. 4, Sec. 1171)
MEANS "JUST OR FAIR DIVISION."
The statute in question, Section 2455, expressly says
that:

'' * * * 'vhere t'vo or more persons apply to
exercise such preference right the Secretary of
the Interior is authorized to make an equitable
division of the land among such applicants.
It is our contention that the distribution here made
was not equitable. The record shows that the Department of the Interior treated the term "equitable" as
though it meant "equal". The Department, therefore,
gave Wayne Mason six 40 acre tracts and William lVIason
seven 40 acre tracts. The seventh went to William ~Iason
because he initiated the sale proceedings.

19
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There was at the time the sale was consummated
an administrative regulation in effect which provided
as follows: ( 43 C.F.R. 250.11 (b) 3)
''Where there is a conflict between two or
more persons claiming a preference right of purchase, they will be allowed 30 days from receipt
of notice within which to agree among themselves
upon a division of the. tracts in conflict by subdivision. In the absence of an agreement the
regional administrator will make a determination
equitably apportioning the various subdivisions
among the claimants, ordinarily so as to equalize
as nearly as possible the tracts they should be
permitted to purchase. * * * ''
Since the hearing, a new Federal regulation has
been adopted. The regulation now in effect provides as
follows:
''Section 250.11 (b) ( 3) is amended to read as
follows:
'' § 250.11 Action at close of bidding.
* * *

(b) Preference right of purchase; declaration
of purchaser. * * •
' ' ( 3) Where there is a conflict between two or
more persons claiming a preference right of purchase, they 'vill be allowed 30 days from receipt
of notice within which to agree among themselves
upon a. division of the tracts by subdivisions. In
the absence of an agreement an equitable division
of the land will be made taking into consideration
such factors a.s ( i) the equalizing of the number of
acres which each claimant will be permitted to
purchase, ( ii) desirable land use, based .on topography, land pattern, location of water, and similar
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factors, and (iii) legitimate historical use, including construction and maintenance of authorized
improvements. If equitable consirl erations dictate
all of the subdivisions may be awarded to on.e of
the claima.nts. Where only one subdivision is offered for sale and it adjoins the lands of two or
more preference right claimants, it will, in the
absence of equitable considerations requiring
other,vise, be awarded to the applicant for the
sale if he is a qualified person who properly
asserts such a preference right within or prior to
the 30-day preference-right period. The manager
will make the award by declaring the appropriate
claimant or claimants purchasers of the land.
"R.S. 2478, 43 U.S.C. 1201)
DOUGLAS McKAY
Secretary of the Interior
''June 4, 1953.''
We think that it is important to note that these
administrative regulations are nothing more than administrative "guesses" as to what the statute means.
There has been no amendment to the statute. It is the
statute 'vhich gives to the parties their rights. The Department of the Interior is simply an administrator to
see that the rights granted by the statute are given to
the parties. The statute itself no'v provides and has at
all times rna terial to this suit provided that :

'''X:

=i-:=

* 'vhere two or more persons apply to

exercise such preference right the Secretary of
the Interior is authorized to make an equitable
division of the land among such applicants.''
The issue is : What is the meaning of this statutory
language~ The administrative regulations interpreting
21
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this statute represent only the Department's interpretation or "guess" at what the statute means. They have
made at least two guesses as to its meaning. One of the
guesses is contained in the regulation quoted first above,
and is also quoted by the Solicitor in his opinion. The
Department's present ''guess'' at what the language
means is set forth in the second regulation quoted above.
The Department's present opinion of the meaning of
the statute is that "equitable" requires the Department
to take into consideration the nature of the past useage,
the topography, the water holes, the land holdings of each
individual and permits the awarding of all the acreage
to one of the parties if such would be equitable.
There is a square Utah Supreme Court opinion supporting our contention that these Department regulations
are nothing more than administrative guesses as to the
meaning of the statute. The statute mea.ns the same now
as it did when it wa.s enacted. The statute is not changed
by erroneous administrative interpretations. This was
very well stated by the Utah Supreme Court in a recent
case entitled Utah Hotel Company v. Industrial Commission, 107 Utah 24, 151 P. ( 2d) 467. In that case the Supreme Court said at page 32:
''An administrative interpretation out of harmony and contrary to the express provisions of
the statute can not be given weight. To do so
would in effect amend the statute. Construction
may not be substituted for legislation.''
The Utah Supreme Court cited Manhattan General
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enue, 297 U. S. 129, 56 S. Ct. 397, in support of its holding
and quoted with approval the following:
''The power of an administrative officer or
Board to administer a Federal statute and to
prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not
the power to make law * * * but the power to
adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of
Congress as expressed by the statute. A regulation which does not do this, but operates to create
a rule out of harmony with the statute is a mere
nullity, and not only must a regulation, in order
to be valid, be consistent 'vith the statute, but it
must be reasonable.''
The United States Supreme Court case involved a
new regulation which was in harmony with the Federal
statute. One of the parties who relied on an earlier
regulation contended that the new regulation could not
be retroactively applied to him. The court said:
''The contention that the new regulation was
retroactive is without merit, since the original
regulation could not be applied, the amended regulation in effect became the primary and controlling
rule in respect of the situation presented. It pointed the way; for the first time, for correctly applying the antecedent statute to a situation which
arose under the statute. * ':~ * The statute defines
the rights of the taxpayer and fixes a standard by
which such rights are to be measured. The regulation constitutes only a step in the administrative
process. It does 'not, and could not, alter the statute. 'X:**''
Our Utah Supreme Court then went on to state:
''The case stands clearly for the doctrine that
when an administrative tribunal makes an 'initial
23
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guess' as to "\vhat effect a statute has, that guess
is not to any extent binding on the courts or upon
the administrative tribunal which made said
erroneous guess. When a new regulation is passed
or "\vhen the statute is for the first time considered
by the courts, it seems clearly correct to state
that the new rulings are not retroactive, but that
they are in fact but the first correct application
of the law."
This holding was later followed by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of New Park Min.ing Cornpany
v. Tax Commission, decided in 1948, 113 Utah 410, 196
P. (2d) 485. The Utah.Supreme Court stated:
''Even if there were an administrative interpretation such as plaintiff asserts, this court could
not permit such an interpretation to stand in flat
contradiction to the clear terms of the. statute."
Thus, both the Utah Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court have unequivocally stated that
administrative interpretations of statutes are nothing
more than administrative guesses about the meaning of
the statute. The two Federal regulations quoted above
are nothing more than that. The administrator has taken
two "guesses" at what the statute means. Like the
United States Supreme Court said in the case quoted
above, ''it is the statute ~vlzich gives. to the pa.rties their
rights.'' The administrative officer is charged with administering those rights. In the ordinary course of administration, the administrative officer must take the
first ''guess'' at what the statute means. Unless his
"guess" is in harmony with the statute, it is as the Utah
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Supreme Court has said, a ''mere nullity''. Here the
administrator passed one regulation which interpreted
the word "equitable" to mean "equal". He subsequently
took another ''guess'' at the statute and said the word
"equitable'' means that all of the land can be passed to
one individual if in consideration of historical useage,
acreage holding, topography, "~ater, etc., it 'vas equitable
to do so. If any weight whatever is to be given to these
administrative ''guesses'', we submit that the Department's present interpretation of the statute should be
given the greater weight.
Basically, however, as the Utah and United States
Supreme Courts have stated, the meaning of a statute is
a judicial question and no "\Veight is given to administrative interpretations unless they are in harmony with the
statute. Interpretations out of harmony are nullities.
In the instant case, there can hardly be any doubt
that it is not equitable to give Wayne Mason six of the
thirteen 40 acre tracts. From a standpoint of historical
use, all parties admit that all thirteen tracts of the land
in question "\vere used as a unit " ith the William Mason
Ranch. Wayne :Nlason, 'vho at one time owned the William :l\iason Ranch, operated the t\\'O as a unit. Before
and since he sold the William 1\tlason ranch to the plaintiff's predecessors in title, and they to the plaintiff, the
lands have been operated as a unit. The only water
\vhich is available for use is located on William Mason's
private land. The topography is such that the lands can
best be used by William Mason. In land acreage Wayne
1fason has one 40 acre tract which he bought at the very
7
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time of the sale for the sole purpose of interjecting himself into this picture. He has no water. His 40 acres
of private land would only sustain three cattle for
three months. The other users in the area have operated
in common with their stock. They have large holdings,
and they have had water at either end of their range, and
it is indispensable to their operation that they be able
to cross over some of the 40 acre tracts awarded by the
administrator to Wayne Mason. It is not equitable to
let Wayne 1\{ason, who has no historical use, no water,
no other lands that have been used jointly with these,
to come in and take half the land and make a nuisance
of himself in the middle of an established livestock
operation. Whatever past historical use Wayne Mason
had in connection with these lands, he had at a time
when he was the owner of the William Mason ranch, and
any historical considerations passed to William Mason
when he purchased that ranch.
Any reference to a dictionary will demonstrate that
the word "equitable" does not mean "equal". Black's
Law Dictionary gives the following definition of '' equitable":
''Just; conformable to the principles of justice
and right.
"Just, fair, and right, in consideration of the
facts and circumstances of the individual case.
''Existing in equity; available or sustainable
only in equity, or only upon the rules and principles of equity."
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Black's law Dictionary gives the following definition
of "equal":
''Alike ; uniform; in the same plane or level
with respect to efficiency, 'vorth, value, amount,
or rights.''
''Equitable'' is defined in 30 C.J.S., page 297 as follows:
''Commonly defined to mean according to the
principles of equity or characterized by equity or
fairness ; fair and just; marked by due consideration for what is fair, unbiased or impartial; reasonable or right. * * *
"Equal" is defined in 30 C.J.S., page 292 as follows:
"as a verb: To make equivalent to, or to
answer in full proportion, to recompense fully.
''As an adjective : The word generally refers
to size or quantity, meaning like or same; even,
sameness of quantity or degree, the same. * * * ''
In the case of Van Horn v. Van Horn, 119 P. 21, 825,
189 Oklahoma 624, the Court 'vas concerned with the difference between the words "equitable" and "equal".
It was a case in which a decree of divorce made no provision as to the division of property, which pursuant to
an Oklahoma statute 'vas to be divided equitably. Of
this the Court said :
'' 1\.nother rule which seems to have been viola ted by this decree and 'vhich is bonding on the
Court irrespective as to whether the divorce is
granted to the husband or to the wife, is that the
defendant is entitled to a fair and equitable division of the property acquired during the marriage.
27
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(Citing cases) This equitable division referred to
in these decisions does not necessarily mean an
equal division of the property, but means what it
says, an equitable division. * ~· *
"The rule is that a Court of equity in granting
a divorce is required by statute to make a just and
fair as well as an equitable division of the property. In doing so it is not required that the property be divided equally, but there should be a wife
latitude as to ho\v much shall be given to each.''
See also the cases of Hughes v. Hughes, 177 Oklahoma 614, 61 P. 2d 556, and Van· Schaick v. Astor, 274
N.Y.S. 322.
CONCLUSION
The District Court had jurisdiction to inquire into
and correct errors committed by the Bureau of Land
Management where such errors arose from misconstruction of the lavv and \vhere they prejudiced private rights.
At the time of the above mentioned sale, and for
more than 30 days thereafter, Wayne Mason did not own
fee title to any lands contiguous to the isolated tracts
here in controversy, and thus was not entitled to a preference right to purchase any of such tracts under the
provisions of Section 2455 of the Revised Statutes, as
amended. The District Court erred in holding that
Wayne J.\tiason did have such a preference right.
"Equitable Division," in Section 2455 of the Revised
Statutes, as amended, means a division 'vhich is "just,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

fair, and right, in consideration of the facts and circumstances of the individual case.'' The District Court was
correct in holding that the Bureau of Land Management
erred in construing ''equitable division'' to mean ''equal
division."
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD W. CLYDE
Attorney for Respondent
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